The Zedillo Period and Political Reform (1994-1999)

Ernesto Zedillo would not have been the choice as candidate for presidency by the PRI in 1994. Feuding party elites selected him because he would be safe and offered no threat of making major changes (Mexico's Chernenko). He continued the technoratic line of Mexican presidents that included deferring meeting social needs to control spending, budgetary austerity, neoliberal economic policies stresses development based on exports and and open market .However, the growing social and political crisis in Mexico (the revolt in chiapas, the guerrillas in Guerrero, growing popular resistence in the streets, a middle class debtors movement known as El Barzon) and the growing strength of the political opposition (the PRD and the PAN) compelled him to institute political reforms aimed at containing or heading off this social crisis. He instituted reforms aimed at decentrallization, democratization within the PRI, and democratization of the broader Mexican political process. These reforms were also necessary to maintain investor confidence in Mexico--an essential need of the Receiver State.More specifically, Zedillo did the following:

Zedillo might have been forced into these concessions because the declining resources of the PRI did not allow it to maintain its clients at the state and local level in the same way that the PRI had been able to do so in the past. The changes did not alwys produce positive results:

Feudalization of Power- One result was the feudalization of power whereby local PRI elites began to run local fiefdoms and to set their own rules at the local levels due to the declining resources coming from the national government and due to their resistence to reform. This includes stronger links with drug lords, private armies of thugs to attack Zapatistas in Chiapas and the like.
Governorships to Opposition-More governorships are now held by the opposition (the PRD and the PAN) as they are now "allowed" to hold these offices if they win the elections. The PRD is a Center-Left political party led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. It has been critical of neoliberal policies and favors a more populist approach and a more active role by government in meeting the needs of Mexico's poor majority. The PAN originated as a Catholic party. It is a conservative party of the Right that believes in neoliberalism and the market but differs from the PRI mostly that it rejects the PRI's corruption. In 1996, for the first time in Mexico's history, the opposition controlled the majority of the Chamber of Deputies (the national legislature). But the divisions between the PAN and the PRD have helped the PRI hold on to power.
Fissures in the PRI-Splits in the PRI have helped the PRD win some governorships because most of the PRD governors are disgruntled PRI leaders who were passed over in the nomination for governor by the PRI and who then jumped over to the PRD, ran as PRD candidates, and won election as governors. This has created conflicts and splits between the PRD ideologues and its pragmatists with the ideologues claiming they are becoming just a farm team for disgruntled PRI leaders. Also, this has created splits between the leadership of the PRI and the mass base that is suspicious of PRD governors who just weeks prior were local leaders of the PRI.

From these comments, it is obvious that one good result of Zedillo's reforms is that there is a real politics occuring for the first time in Mexico that involves forces outside of the PRI in a significant way. In other words, there is increasing political contestation in what was before a simple authoritarian party-state. Some believe that there is emerging in Mexico a democratic political culture that is now in its infancy and that now confronts the established political culture of caudillismo and top down rule.

The Election in the year 2000-
The PRI- The major contenders for the candidacy of the PRI are Fracisco Labastida, former Secretary of Interior (gobernacion) and Roberto Madrazo (governor of Tabasco state). Madrzo has broken ranks with the traditional prty practice of discrete debate and has attacked his own party's approach to political economy by questioning what good it does for the average Mexican to have "macreconomic equilibrium" if he is starving. He has waged a modern television campaign (now possible because there is a less controlled T.V. Azteca) based on negative ads that have catapulted him upwardly inn the polls. This could prove to be a problem for the PRI because should Madrazo wil the nomination of the PRI, he will bring many negatives with him. These include:
1) electoral fraud in the 1996 elections to the governorship of Tabasco. Madrazo spent more than 75 million dollars to be elected. Wherre did the funds come from? Drugs? Theft of public funds? The election was so controversial that Zedillo tried to void the result but Madrazo ralled the party faithful in the state political machine and was able to hang on to power.
2) Madrazo's links to king-maker Hank Gonzales (former mayor of the federal deistrict and secretary of agriculture who amassed a gigantic fortune while in "public service"). Gonzales is widely reputed to be linked to narco-traffikers and drug cartels (that of Felix Arrellano brothers in Baja California).

What the PRI primaries are doing is splitting the party because there is no tradition of "graceful losing" in Mexico and PRI leaders are not used to elections that are really contested. They are used to arranged elections and, when things don't go their way, they bolt the party (as they have been doing by moving over to the PRD).

The PRD- The PRD's top leader (some might say caudillo after the primary elections of last March of 1999) is Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, mayor of Mexico City as of 1997. The party has two major fissures or splits: that between the top leaders (Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo) and that between the cupula (top) of the party and its mass base. The leadership conflict stems from Munoz Ledo's objections to the "authoritarian" manner in which Cardenas acted during the party primary and the fraud that occured in those election that led him to blast Cardenas as a dictator. It is possible that he will bolt the PRD and run against Cardenas. The mass base is suspcious of the cupula or top of the party because of its tendency to collaborate with disgruntled PRI leaders who are then made PRD gubernatorial candidates. Leaders at the mass level resent being pased over for PRI leaders. They also complain of too mcuh control by Cardenas from the top and of the corruption in the PRD primary elections that forced them to be cancelled and the election results to be annulled.

For the more conservative sectors of Mexican society, Cardenismo (with its populism and its reliance on the state) now seem outmoded. The problem the PRD faces is how to hold on to its mass base (which demands populist measures) without freightening international capital which will be crucial to the survival of any Mexican government as Mexico has become a Receiver State. On the Left, there is great suspicion of the tendency among the leaders of the PRD to cut deals with disgruntled PRI leaders who then run as PRD candidates for governor (winning four or five governorships for the PRD). This is too much pragmatism and lack of principle for the Left of the PRD.

Also, Cardenas' performance as mayor of Mexico City is criticized because the problems of poverty, crime, police corruption, pollution, and education have not abated under his administration. In fairness, the PRI (that still controls the national government and Treasury and budget) has not done very much by way of funding or aid to make Cardenas' administration a booming success. It is not in their interests to do so. In fact, the opposite is true. A successful Carenas would then be a formidable challenge to the PRI in the next presidential elections.

The PAN (Partido Accion Nacional)- This is a conservative party of the Right that is strong in northern Mexico and among northern industrialists and the middle class. It stands for neoliberalism, market economies, fiscal and monetary austerity. It differs with the PRI mainly in that it attacks the PRI's corruption.

The PAN is also divided as there are leadership rivalries between its top leaders, Vicente Fox (governor of the state of Guanajuato) and Diego Ceballos (the party's candidate for president in the 1994 elections). Fox has won national and international prominance for his skillful administration of his state. He has decentralized government and allowed more autonomy to municipios (cities). He has curbed excessive spending and run an efficient state administration. He has also sought to deal with the problems of average people in the state (poverty, lack of schools, infrastructure) as a conservative populist. A former top executive for Coca Cola in Mexico, this is the type of leader that is favored by international capital and that would win approval among U.S. leadership circles. His success has outshined that of Diego Ceballos thus creating a leadership rivalry within that party.

In early October of 1999, a proposed pact between the PRD and the PAN failed because the leaders of the two parties (Cardenas and Vicente Fox) could not agree on a common candidate to run against the PRI in the next presidential elections in 2000. Cardenas pulled out of the negotiations thus increasing the likelihood of a PRI victory (because the opposition would split its vote).

Trends- In the Zedillo era, there has been little change in the development strategy based on export promotion and neoliberalism. Mexico continues to be a Receiver State whose major role seems to be a model debtor extracting resources from Mexican soceity in order to pay debt. There is a maquiladorization of the Mexican economy as assembly plants now move to the central region and to the southern part of the country (they were once found almost exclusively in the north). Although there is a growth in independent labor organizations, the government still used a heavy hand to control them through non-recognition and through support of ghost unions. Ghost unions are non-existant unions that charge employers money to maintain labor peace (it is really an extortion racket) with the backing of local authorities.

At the societal level there is a burgeoning movement for change in a civil society that is fed up with the entire Mexican political class. As of October of 1999, there has been a strike at the UNAM over increased tuition fees, overcrowding, and decreasing access to the national university that has lasted for months. Chiapas continues to be in rebellion. Crime has sky-rocketed to such levels that people have taken the law into their own hands and executed common petty thieves. The police (especially the federal police) is feared because large numbers of policemen are either linked to local crime rings or themselves engage in kidnappings and other forms of crime. Drug-trafficking has become an industry estimated at 35 billion dollars per year. Popular organizations have emerged in the barrios to organize self-help groups in light of the government's inability or unwillingness to help them with their problems. The emerging civil society in Mexico and popular movements is described best in James Cockcroft's recent book Mexico's Hope.

The budgets are balanced, foreign creditors are paid on time, and foreign investors are thus reassured while the political system fractures as it confronts a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of social cohesion and social dissolution. This is the perfect model of Nef's Receiver State.

Vicente Fox- Vicente Fox was elected president in July of 2000 in elections that, by Mexican standards, were relatively free of naked corruption and manipulation. Fox was a relative outsider to the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) machinery. He headed Coca Cola in Mexico and was governor of the central state of Guanajuato where he made a name for himself as a pragmatic reformer. He fought corruption and was a populist type leader of the state. He was a fiscally prudent manager who brought a populist pro-business style of governance. The election of Fox brought no new agenda to Mexico regarding the management of the economy as he is committed to the North American Free Trade Agreement, open markets, and even freer trade. Fox continued to ground Mexico in the strategy of his predecessors: making Mexico a junior partner to the United States. He proposed a more liberal regime in the treatment of migrant worker that would include an agreement with the U.S. to allow more Mexican workers into the U.S. as guest workers.

In Fox, we see the consolidation of the junior partner strategy and its deepening. For example, Mexico has taken a more critical stance towards Cuba and has moved away from its historical stance of maintaining good and close relations to Cuba. Fox's quest for a special relationship to U.S. has been stymied by George Bush's preoccupation with terrorism and the Middle East. Domestically, he is perceived as a lackluster president  who has made promises that he is not keeping. He is hindered by a legislature that is controlled by opposition parties and that is asserting its powers more than ever before. Although the macroeconomic fundamentals are for now stable, high levels of poverty, unemployment, and insecurity (kidnappings, theft, robberies) continue to plague Mexico. While he has made high-profile attacks on drug cartels and on official corruption, the economic maladies of the country--for which he has no answers except more of the same policies of the past--continue to dog him. 

With Fox, according to the mainstream political scientist Roderick Ai Camp, there has been recruitment of elites from outside of the federal capital. The inability of the PRI to control the presidency and its inability to reward elite followers has led to a decentralization of power. Governors and local officials are more involved in decision-making than in the past. Fox is a product of Catholic education and the prospects for the Catholic church in increasing its political influence are enhanced by his presidency. Unlike Camp, I believe it is too early to proclaim Mexico as a fledgling democracy as authoritarian patterns of rule are too deeply established and the PRI remains a very strong force in Mexican political life.

(Evaluation of Fox Period as of 2006 and prognosis of what will happen under Calderón)

Vicente Fox won the presidency in 2000 largely on the issue of opposing corruption and his offer to bring efficient and more democratic administration to Mexico. But he faced a difficult situation both politically and economically. Economically, he could not move outside of the neoliberal framework that he inherited even if he so desired (and he didn't desire that as he is committed to the market model). More than 85% of Mexico's trade is with the United States. He could not get a valued added tax passed through Congress so he staked his administration on securing an immigration accord that would allow 3 million Mexicans to enter the United States as guest workers. Prior to September 11, 2001, that was a possibility but after that date, U.S. attention was focused on the Middle East and the immigration accord was placed lower in Bush's agenda. The swelling tide of illegal immigration to the U.S. created divisions within the Republican Party that made passage of a sweeping immigration accord impossible. At the same time, growing competition from countries like China led to a decline of about 25% of the maquiladoras in northern Mexico. Mexico relies more on more on remittances from Mexicans in the United States to maintain its economy and this sets limits on Mexico's independence vis-a-vis the United States.

Politically, the Fox period was a period of immobilism because of the control of many bureaucratic posts by PRI members and the control of the legislature by opposition parties (the PRI and the PRD). Democratization has led to an increased power in the legislative branch that has limited the president's ability to impose policies as was the case in the previous 70 plus years. Consequently, the Fox period was one of economic and political immobility.

Mexican political culture has not changed to match the growing democratization that has taken place in Mexico reflected in the elections of 2000. Mexicans demand a strong presidency but the growing influence of opposition parties, the increased power of the legislature, decentralization of power have all lessened the capacity of the president to impose his will. Mexicans have come to expect a government that directs. So a president like Fox is perceived as weak and ineffectual because that changes wrought in the 1990's have made him weaker. Political parties maneuver for advantages in the legislature but there is no unified political vision or unified political culture. Mexico is in transition but one is not quite sure to what. U.S. scholars stress that Mexico is in transition to democracy and that democratization in Mexico is consolidated. But the underlying authoritarian political culture of the past is still quite strong . Some want the return to the old state but that is less and less possible given the openings already established and the demands of forces outside of Mexico (such as foreign investors). The conflict between "democratic" tendencies and 70+ years of authoritarianism will last for some time to come. Meanwhile, immobilism--both economic and political--prevail.

Mexico exemplifies a country that has gone through the full cycle of revolutionary development (overthrow of the old order, institutionalization, bureaucratization) but the myth of "The Revolution" has long died. The legislature is now dominated by opposition parties (PRD and PRI) while the president-elect (Calderon) comes from the PAN party. This divided government reflects the division in the country as reflected in the close and controversial election of July 2006. What is most likely is increasing collaboration between the PAN and the PRI as both support neoliberal policies championed by Mexico's economic elite. The populist PRD will likely face a co-gobierno of the other two parties as the most likely partner of the PAN will be the PRI. Without the PRI as a partner in the legislature, the administration of Calderón will face the same immobility that plagued Vicente Fox.

But the strong showing of the PRD in the 2006 elections will force both the PRD and the PRI to strike out in a more populist direction if only to head of the growing power of the PRD. This could involve some increases in social provision along the lines of what López Obrador put into place in Mexico City during his term as mayor. Calderón will strike out to reform the energy sector and its "modernization" will, most likely, include opening up the energy sector to foreign investment, joint ventures and other such measures. In light of how government ownership of oil has become symbolic of Mexico's national sovereignty, token populism might be necessary by the PAN to make palatable the changes in the energy sector that are not palatable to many in Mexico.

Meanwhile, serious problems abound such as:
-Drug cartels and their penetration of the federal police and local police forces
-persisting poverty for at least 40% of the population
-unemployment and the need to absorb approximately 1 million new workers per year
-increasing reliance of the Mexican economy on foreign remittances
-the decline in the export processing zones (maquiladoras) due to foreign competition (especially from China)
-unrest in an awakened civil society (such as schoolteachers)

The troubles in Oaxaca are symptomatic of this last point. Since June of 2006, schoolteachers have gone on strike demanding higher wages and more investment in education from the administration of Ulises Ruiz, governor of Oaxaca. This strike affected 1.3 millioon shcool children in the state. The APPO (Asamblea Popular del Pueblo de Oaxaca) is an umbrella organization of some 350 organizations that is at the center of the strike. After more than five months of strikes, they occupied the center of the capital driving off police and obstructing business and tourism. They established a camp known as the Plantón that covered 56 city blocks. They accuse the governor of stealing the election in 2004 and of cronyism that favors his supporters. While he has done little to improve education, teachers point to the fact that he spent $175 million to remodel the city center (Zocalo) and to modernize a sports stadium.

Under pressure by the national union of teachers (SINTE), the 70,000 teachers voted to end the strike. But this vote was annulled by those favoring continuation of the strike. They claimed the vote was held under duress as the national union threatened to decertify the Oaxaca teachers union. 5,000 PFP (Federal Preventive Police) cleared the Zocalo in late October 2006. Since the PRI controls governorships in 17 of 32 states who demand that Ruiz stay, and the PAN needs PRI support, Fox has not been able to do what previous presidents were able to do: intervene and remove the governor. This strike is a preview of what is likely to continue into the Calderon presidency.

A poll  of 1200 adults in Oaxaca conducted on October 12, 2006 asking whether Governor Ruiz should resign revealed that 50% were in favor and 39% opposed (11% not sure).